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INTRODUCTION
Accusations of illegality have dogged the Obama Administration’s efforts
to implement the Affordable Care Act (ACA),1 the most ambitious piece of
social legislation since the advent of Medicare and Medicaid. Some of the
accusations have merit; indeed, it would be surprising if they did not. Even

† Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. For their helpful comments, I would
like to thank Jonathan Adler, Josh Blackman, Cary Coglianese, Kristina Daugirdas, Tim Jost,
Marty Lederman, David Martin, Julian Mortenson, Eric Posner, and Adrian Vermeule, as well as
the participants in this symposium.
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029. For ease of reference, and unless otherwise noted, citations will be to the scattered provisions
of the U.S. Code codifying the ACA.
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as the ACA’s rollout has exposed unanticipated difficulties in the statutory
design, congressional antipathy to health reform has precluded looking to the
legislature to iron out those difficulties. To secure his principal achievement,
President Obama has repeatedly tested the limits of executive authority in
implementing the ACA.
Six years after its enactment and two years after its full implementation,
now is an auspicious time to take stock. Moving past the partisan bickering,
to what extent has the Obama Administration skirted the law or broken
conventions to implement the ACA? In what ways, if any, has the messy
implementation process set worrisome precedents? How troubled should we
be if the Administration has at times brushed up against and even exceeded
the limits of its power?
To get traction on these questions, this Article takes a close look at the
most hotly debated legal questions surrounding the ACA’s rollout. The
selections reflect my own judgments about the most serious allegations of
executive impropriety, but they are not idiosyncratic: they closely track—and
indeed go beyond—the selections made by those seeking to demonstrate the
President’s disregard for law.2 My hope is that a holistic and even-handed
examination of the Administration’s purported legal excesses will provide a
useful focal point for understanding how law restrains executive discretion in
a time of polarized politics. The Article closes with some thoughts about the
status of executive lawbreaking in American constitutional culture and how
to discipline such lawbreaking when it occurs.
I. TESTING LEGAL LIMITS
A. Essential Health Benefits
To ensure access to a comprehensive roster of basic services, the ACA
requires health insurance for individuals and small businesses to cover the
“essential health benefits.”3 The ACA, however, does not define what those
benefits are. Instead, it instructs the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to specify what counts as essential, subject to
some general guidelines.4 Essential benefits must include, for example,

2 See, e.g., Senator Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 100-07 (2015) (discussing “six major” legal violations committed by the
Obama Administration with respect to its implementation of the ACA); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Cato Institute and Prof. Josh Blackman in Support of Petitioners at 2-3, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(2015) (No. 14-114) (arguing that the Obama Administration effectively rewrote the ACA by improperly
modifying, delaying, and suspending the ACA’s coverage rules, mandates, and subsidies).
3 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (2012).
4 Id. § 18022(b)(1).
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emergency services, hospitalization, prescription drugs, and the like.5 The
scope of the benefits must also be “equal to the scope of benefits provided
under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary.”6 The
Secretary is otherwise afforded wide discretion to decide which treatments
and services are essential.
Actually making those decisions promised to be both delicate and
controversial. Too expansive a definition would drive up the cost of coverage,
burdening working families and discouraging healthy people from buying
insurance. But a narrower definition would deprive patients of access to care
deemed nonessential, which would infuriate hospitals, physicians, and drug
manufacturers that wished to offer that care. Whatever the ultimate outcome,
the Secretary’s decision would “influence the nature of coverage available to
millions of people in the United States.”7
When Congress enacted the ACA, the universal expectation was that the
Secretary would specify a uniform, nationwide roster of benefits. It was thus
front-page news—“a major surprise”8—when, late in 2011, HHS released a
terse, thirteen-page Internet bulletin announcing that it would punt the
decision to the states.9 Per the bulletin, each of the states would identify a
“benchmark” plan from among existing plans sold to small businesses or
government employees.10 Whatever benefits that the benchmark plan covered
would then be considered “essential” within the state.11 For states that
declined to select a plan, the benchmark would be the largest small-group
plan in the state.12 After President Obama’s 2012 reelection, HHS proposed
and finalized a rule adopting the benchmark approach.13
Politically, the decision was shrewd. It allowed the Obama Administration
to sidestep a fractious rulemaking, avoid disruption to state insurance
markets, and signal that the ACA was not a national takeover of the health
insurance markets. As a policy matter, the approach also held appeal. The
bulletin explained that even across different states, health plans “do not differ
significantly in the range of services they cover.”14 Because no state could

5 Id.
6 Id. § 18022(b)(2)(A).
7 CHERYL ULMER ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PERSPECTIVES ON
ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: WORKSHOP REPORT 17 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Robert Pear, Health Care Law Will Let States Tailor Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A1.
9 CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS
BULLETIN 8-9 (2011).
10 Id. at 9.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (2015).
14 CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 4.
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select a barebones plan and deny vital services to their residents,15 deferring
to the states appeared reasonable.
But is the benchmark approach legal?16 Nothing in the ACA explicitly
prohibits the Secretary from adopting a state-specific, non-uniform approach
to essential health benefits. As a first cut, the ACA’s silence suggests that
HHS, per Chevron, 17 can fill the gap as it sees fit.
The lack of an outright prohibition, however, does not necessarily mean
that HHS can allow the essential health benefits to vary from state to state.18
The question under Chevron “is always whether the agency has gone beyond
what Congress has permitted it to do,”19 and it is difficult to square the
benchmark approach with many features of the ACA’s design. The implication
is that, although Congress gave HHS broad discretion to define the essential
health benefits, it may not have conferred the discretion to define them in
this state-specific manner.20
The most obvious objection to the Agency’s approach is actually the least
persuasive. The ACA delegates to HHS—not the states—the power to define
the essential health benefits.21 Under D.C. Circuit case law, the Agency can’t
subdelegate that power to the states unless the ACA says it can22—and the
ACA says no such thing. At first blush, HHS’s pre-commitment to adopting
state-selected benchmarks looks like that kind of prohibited subdelegation.
But is that really what’s going on? Under the same D.C. Circuit case law,
an agency can properly “turn to an outside entity for advice and policy
recommendations, provided the agency makes the final decisions itself.”23 To
my mind, that’s the more accurate way to characterize what HHS has done.
The Agency made the final decision about essential health benefits when it
identified a narrow set of presumptively acceptable benchmark plans. Having
15
16

See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
The following discussion draws on my prior work on the question. See generally
Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care Act: Law and
Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL, POL’Y & L. 441 (2014).
17 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
18 See Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (“To suggest . . . that Chevron step two is implicated any time a statute does not
expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative power (i.e. when the statute is not written in ‘thou
shalt not’ terms), is both flatly unfaithful to the principles of administrative law . . . and refuted by
precedent.”).
19 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013).
20 Cf., e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (rejecting an agency interpretation that
was a “poor fit” with the statute); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 401
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (same).
21 42 U.S.C. § 18022(a)(1), (b)(1)(4) (2012).
22 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the FCC
could not delegate its regulatory authority to an outside entity without “an affirmative showing of
congressional authorization”).
23 Id. at 568.
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made that critical decision, HHS can heed a state’s choice about which
particular plan, among acceptable alternatives, should serve as the benchmark.
A much more serious objection is that the benchmark approach renders a
number of provisions of the ACA inscrutable or unnecessary. Consider, for
example, how the ACA treats state coverage mandates. Such mandates are
common: states variously require health plans to cover benefits like in vitro
fertilization or applied behavior analysis for autism.24 But Congress did not
want federal taxpayers, who heavily subsidize individual health plans, to foot
the bill for state-mandated treatments beyond those deemed essential.25 The
ACA thus limits federal subsidies to covering the essential health benefits26
and requires states “to defray the cost of any additional benefits.”27
The benchmark approach throws this carefully considered allocation of
financial responsibility out the window. By dint of state law, any state-selected
benchmark plan will necessarily cover state-mandated benefits. Such benefits
will thus be folded into the definition of essential health benefits within the
state. The upshot is that even a state with extravagant coverage mandates will
never have to assume any additional costs to cover them. In effect, the
benchmark approach allocates more federal subsidies to states with more
extensive coverage mandates—contrary to Congress’s deliberate attempt to
avoid that result.
The difficulties run deeper. For example, the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) is supposed to contract with insurers to provide at least
two “multi-State” plans on each state’s exchange.28 But those plans, by statute,
must “offer[] a benefits package that is uniform in each State and consists of
the essential benefits.”29 A benefits package cannot be uniform across states
if the essential health benefits vary from state to state.
OPM has tried to avoid the problem by reading the phrase “uniform in
each State” to mean that the benefits “must be uniform within a State, but
not necessarily uniform among States.”30 That interpretation is linguistically
plausible, but it leaves the uniformity requirement with no work to do. A
given health plan’s benefits are uniform in the state in which it is sold; if an
insurer wished to offer a different benefits package, it would create and
market a different health plan. Because the benefits package of a given
multistate health plan will thus never vary within a state, Congress had no
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Bagley & Levy, supra note 16, at 451.
26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(D)(ii) (2012).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2012).
Id. § 18054(a)(1).
Id. § 18054(c)(1)(A).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of the Multi-State Plan Program for
the Affordable Insurance Exchanges, 77 Fed. Reg. 72,582, 72,589 (proposed Dec. 5, 2012).
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need to insist on uniformity “within a State,” as OPM would have it.31 The
provision is meaningful only if it requires uniformity across states. OPM’s
interpretation also trivializes a related provision allowing states to impose
their coverage mandates on multistate plans, but only if they pay the
increased expense.32 This deliberate and limited carve-out from the
uniformity requirement would have been totally unnecessary if state plans
must only be “uniform within a State.”
All told, the benchmark approach is in tension with several ACA
provisions. The hard question is whether that tension is substantial enough
to justify the inference that the adoption of such an approach exceeded
HHS’s delegated authority. In my judgment, it is not, although the question
is close. This is not a case where the agency has exploited statutory silence to
intrude on a regulatory domain that Congress never meant for it to enter.33
HHS instead interpreted a provision that the ACA gave it wide latitude to
interpret. Nor is this a case where the chosen interpretation is completely
incompatible with the statutory design.34 At most, the interpretation is
awkward and generates some statutory surplusage. But interpretations of
complicated and complex statutes will almost always generate some
awkwardness.35 And since HHS can always revisit its benchmark approach—and
indeed, it plans on doing so36—provisions that are extraneous today may not
be extraneous tomorrow. Something more definitive—something closer to
out-and-out irreconcilability—would be necessary to demonstrate that Congress
foreclosed the Obama Administration from adopting a state-centered approach
to the essential health benefits.

31
32
33

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 18054(c)(2)–(4).
See, e.g., ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (invalidating an FTC
interpretation regulating attorneys as “financial institutions” because it was a “poor fit” with the
statutory language and the FTC based its interpretation merely on the fact that the statute did not
specifically exempt attorneys).
34 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160-61 (2000)
(construing the “overall regulatory scheme” of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to
deprive the FDA of the authority to regulate tobacco products).
35 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 722
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s decision to uphold agency’s interpretation of
the Endangered Species Act and arguing that its interpretation “makes superfluous (or
inexplicable)” other provisions of the Act).
36 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,813 (Feb. 27, 2015) committing to the benchmark
approach through 2017 but expressing a willingness to reconsider at that point).
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B. Administrative Delays
Under the ACA’s employer mandate, midsize and large employers must
offer qualifying health coverage to their employees or pay a tax penalty.37 The
mandate was supposed to take effect on January 1, 2014.38 In July 2012,
however, the Obama Administration made a surprise announcement that it
would provide one year of “transition relief ” from the mandate.39 “In our
ongoing discussions with businesses,” the Administration explained, “[W]e
have heard that you need the time to get this right. We are listening.”40
This was to be the first in a series of high-profile administrative delays. A
few months before the ACA’s new insurance rules were to take effect on
January 1, 2014, a number of out-of-compliance health plans issued cancellation
letters to their enrollees. President Obama came in for searing criticism for
violating his oft-repeated claim that “if you like your health care plan, you
can keep it.” Members of Congress, including leading Democrats, proposed
legislation to contain the political damage.41 The Administration believed,
however, that the proposed bills would compromise the effectiveness of the
ACA.42 To quell the controversy and forestall congressional action, the Obama
Administration announced that certain existing health plans “will not be
considered to be out of compliance with the market reforms” for at least
another year.43
These were not the only delays. More quietly, the Administration
announced in early 2013 that, for a subset of insurers, it would delay for one
year a requirement that they cap the amount their enrollees paid out of pocket
for their care.44 In February 2014, the Administration offered a second one-year

37 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012).
38 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513(d), 124 Stat. 119, 256 (2010).
39 Mark J. Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, U.S.
DEP’T TREASURY: TREASURY NOTES (July 2, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages

/Continuing-to-Implement-the-ACA-in-a-Careful-Thoughtful-Manner-.aspx [https://perma.cc/
WEK4-AC86].
40 Valerie B. Jarrett, We’re Listening to Businesses About the Health Care Law, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (July 2, 2013, 6:00 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/02/we-re-listeningbusinesses-about-health-care-law [https://perma.cc/4YHN-SKGT].
41 Manu Raju, Landrieu: Save Current Health Plans, POLITICO (last updated Oct. 31, 2013,
7:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/mary-landrieu-vanishing-health-plans-099101
[https://perma.cc/MDJ2-N37L].
42 Id.
43 Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Ins. Comm’rs
1 (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/letters/downloads/commissioner-letter-1114-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/V456-38PT].
44 Affordable Care Act Implementation FAQs - Set 12, CMS.GOV (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/aca_implementation_faqs12.html
[https://perma.cc/9EYQ-HBMT].
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delay of the employer mandate for midsize firms.45 The following month, the
Administration extended the “like it, keep it” fix for an additional two years.46
Delays in rolling out large government programs are of course common.
The ACA has been plagued with them.47 But none of these delays were the
result of an agency’s failure to meet a deadline or its inability to implement a
congressional instruction. Instead, they resulted from conscious decisions to
delay the dates on which congressional statutes directed at private actors
would take effect.
The Obama Administration appears to justify the delays as routine
exercises of the executive branch’s traditional authority to choose when,
where, and under what circumstances to enforce statutes.48 A federal agency,
as the Supreme Court explained in Heckler v. Chaney, “[G]enerally cannot act
against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.”49
Agencies must instead pick and choose. In the Administration’s telling, the
ACA delays are of a piece with that longstanding practice. They merely
postpone enforcement of certain provisions of the ACA that, in the
Administration’s judgment, are not yet prudent to enforce.
This defense, however, runs counter to legal conventions governing the
President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”50 Most
notably, the administrative delays are not “discretionary judgment[s]
concerning the allocation of enforcement resources” that, according to

45 See Juliet Eilperin & Amy Goldstein, White House Delays Health Insurance Mandate for
Medium-Size Employers Until 2016, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national/health-science/white-house-delays-health-insurance-mandate-for-medium-sizedemployers-until-2016/2014/02/10/ade6b344-9279-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html
[https://perma.cc/V426-6DS9] (explaining that employers with fifty to ninety-nine employees will
be given until 2016 to comply with the employer mandate).
46 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS 2015 Health Policy Standards
Fact Sheet (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Factsheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-03-05-2.html [https://perma.cc/4PYV-V4HN].
47 See generally Memorandum from C. Stephen Redhead, Coordinator, Cong. Research Serv.
et al. (Apr. 21, 2014), http://freebacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/aca_deadlines_memo_update.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3Ml8-D4LT] (providing overview of various ACA agency-action deadlines and
describing agency actions taken to meet those deadlines).
48 See Greg Sargent, White House Defends Legality of Obamacare Fix, WASH. POST: THE
PLUM LINE (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/11/14/
white-house-defends-legality-of-obamacare-fix/ [https://perma.cc/KBZ5-Z8YB] (quoting an HHS
spokesperson saying that “[t]he Supreme Court held more than 25 years ago [in Heckler v. Chaney]
that agencies charged with administering statutes have inherent authority to exercise discretion to
ensure that their statutes are enforced in a manner that achieves statutory goals and are consistent
with other administrative policies”). I say “appears” since the Administration has not offered a
thoroughgoing public defense of the delays.
49 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. I canvassed some of these arguments in Nicholas Bagley, The
Legality of Delaying Key Elements of the ACA, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1967 (2014).
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Heckler, lie at the heart of the nonenforcement power.51 The delays are instead
bald efforts to avoid unwanted consequences associated with full implementation
of the ACA. The delay of the employer mandate, for example, was meant to “give
employers more time to comply with the new rules,”52 not to preserve the
resources of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). And the “like it, keep it” fix
couldn’t have conserved federal resources because the states, not the federal
government, have primary responsibility for enforcing the ACA’s insurance rules.53
If the Administration wished to deprioritize enforcement, it could have
kept quiet about its plans. The regulated community would still have felt
obliged to comply even if the likelihood of enforcement was low. For policy
reasons, however, the Administration wanted to relieve employers and health
plans of certain obligations. The Administration thus used the public
announcements of its nonenforcement policies to encourage the regulated
community to disregard provisions of the ACA. Prospectively licensing large
groups of people to violate a congressional statute for policy reasons is
inimical to the Take Care Clause.54 As the D.C. Circuit has cautioned, “[A]n
agency’s pronouncement of a broad policy against enforcement poses special
risks that it ‘has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so
extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.’”55 The
ACA delays embody that kind of abdication.
Indeed, the delays’ critics find support in an unusual place: the Obama
Administration itself. In November 2014, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
released a careful analysis of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
plans to deprioritize the removal of unauthorized aliens with children in the
United States and grant them “deferred action” status, which would enable
them to work.56 In considering the legality of DHS’s plans, OLC discussed
at length the limits that the Take Care Clause places on the exercise of
enforcement discretion.57 Although OLC eschewed bright-line rules, it reasoned
that nonenforcement is most likely to be constitutionally permissible where
it reflects a genuine, case-by-case effort to devote scarce resources to the most

51
52
53

Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Jarrett, supra note 40.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(2) (2012) (allowing the federal government to enforce only
where “a State has failed to substantially enforce” those rules).
54 For a comprehensive and compelling defense of this view, see Zachary S. Price,
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 676 (2014).
55 Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985)).
56 The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C.,
2014 OLC Lexis 2 (Nov. 19 2014).
57 Id. at *8-19.
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urgent priorities.58 At the same time, however, “the Executive cannot, under
the guise of exercising enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite
the laws to match its policy preferences.”59
Due to their breadth and categorical nature, DHS’s enforcement plans
presented a hard case. With respect to the parents of citizens and lawful
permanent residents, OLC sustained DHS’s approach for three reasons: (1) acute
resource constraints required prioritization; (2) immigration officers retained
discretion to deport low-priority individuals when the circumstances warranted
it; and (3) a number of statutory enactments suggested a congressional policy of
promoting family unity when a child was a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent
resident.60 None of these factors applies to the ACA delays. They were not driven
by resource constraints; they did not preserve discretion to enforce against
egregious offenders; and they found no support in congressional enactments. The
Administration simply suspended parts of the ACA for policy reasons.
With respect to the delays of the employer mandate—but not to the other
delays—the Obama Administration joined its general nonenforcement
argument to a specific claim that Congress has acquiesced to a longstanding,
bipartisan IRS practice of delaying the effective dates of tax statutes.61 For
support, the IRS collected ten examples extending back to 2000.62 In 2007,
for instance, the IRS gave tax preparers an extra six months to prepare for a
new set of rules governing the improper preparation of a tax return.63 And in
2011, the IRS declined to apply an excise tax on airline fuel for a sixteen-day
period where Congress had specified an earlier effective date.64
These past delays, according to the Administration, demonstrate that
Congress has acquiesced to the IRS’s assertion of authority to delay new tax
statutes. My kids make this kind of argument all the time. When I tell my
son to stop jumping on the couch, he’s apt to say that he’s jumped on it before.
For him, my earlier failure to tell him to stop means there is no rule against
jumping on the couch. The Administration’s argument is as weak as my son’s

58
59
60

Id. at *17-19.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *81-82. Since OLC could find no similar congressional solicitude for the parents of
children who were neither citizens nor legally permanent residents, it concluded that DHS’s effort
to grant them deferred action was impermissible. Id. at *82-86.
61 See Letter from Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, Dep’t of the Treasury, to
Fred Upton, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (July 9, 2013),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Treasury-Letter-20140408HL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9JF-483Q] (characterizing the delays as an “exercise of the Treasury
Department’s longstanding administrative authority to grant transition relief when implementing
new legislation like the ACA”).
62 Id. at 2 & n.2.
63 Id. at 2.
64 Id.
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argument. Congress’s failure to rebuke the IRS is not especially good
evidence of congressional acquiescence. Maybe Congress never caught wind
of the practice. (“I didn’t see you jumping on the couch.”) Maybe it heard about
the practice but didn’t think it was worth intervening. (“You’re going to bed in
five minutes anyhow.”) Maybe it was distracted. (“I’m on the phone.”)65
The limited number and scope of past IRS delays underscores that it would
be improper to make too much of Congress’s silence. It’s one thing to delay an
airline excise tax for a little more than two weeks. Congress probably paid little
or no attention to such a modest delay—or even to a dozen others like it. It’s
another thing altogether to delay for a full year (and for midsize employers,
two years) a substantial tax applying to employers that forms an integral part
of a statute aimed at providing near-universal health-care coverage.
The ACA delays thus appear to invade Congress’s prerogative to specify
when its laws come into force. The delays also set a worrisome precedent for
future Presidents. Are all effective dates up for grabs? Are they to be treated
as congressional suggestions that the President can revise, at least for a year
or two? Given the Obama Administration’s willingness to use past extensions
of tax relief as precedent for delaying the employer mandate, the risk seems
especially serious in the tax context. Consider, for example, the ACA’s
Cadillac Tax, which, beginning in 2018, will impose a 40% excise tax on employer
contributions to jumbo insurance plans.66 Although the tax is unpopular across
the political spectrum—indeed, Congress recently suspended it until 2020 in a
bipartisan budget bill67—it arguably holds more promise for reducing long-term
health spending than any other ACA provision.68 Could a future President
suspend it again for a couple of years? The OLC memo suggests not69 but the
pattern of interim delays suggests the contrary. And when it comes to precedent
in the executive branch, deeds matter more than words.
C. Hardship Exemptions
By December 2013, it had become clear that some insurers were still canceling
health plans that were out of compliance with the ACA’s insurance rules,
notwithstanding the Administration’s effort to temporarily relieve them of their

65 For a less cheeky elaboration of this point, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
66 26 U.S.C. § 4980I (2012).
67 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. P, tit. I, § 101(a), 129 Stat.
2242, 3037 (2015).
68 See Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 601, 602 (2010) (explaining how the tax will “help to bend the long-term cost curve”
and “put downward pressure on the growth of healthcare costs”).
69 See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
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obligations to comply.70 Confronted by a restive Congress, the Administration
again took action. In a letter to Virginia Senator Mark Warner, Kathleen Sebelius,
then-Secretary of HHS, sympathized with “those with canceled plans who might
be having difficulty” purchasing a health plan.71 The same day, HHS released a
memorandum confirming that anyone whose plan had been canceled would
be eligible for a hardship exemption from the individual mandate if
replacement coverage on the exchange would be more expensive.72 A few
months later, the Administration quietly announced that the same hardship
exemption would be available until October 2016.73
The move has come under serious criticism. How could the Administration
argue to the Supreme Court that the individual mandate was essential to
making the ACA work when it so blithely waived it for those with canceled
plans?74 Even supporters of the ACA were nervous. As Ezra Klein pointed out,
“Normally, the individual mandate applies to anyone who can purchase
qualifying insurance for less than 8 percent of their income. Either that
threshold is right or it’s wrong. But it’s hard to argue that it’s right for the
currently uninsured but wrong for people whose plans were canceled.”75
As a policy matter, these arguments have force. As a legal matter, however,
they ring hollow. The ACA does exempt from the individual mandate any
person who would have to pay more than 8% of her income for coverage.76
But it also authorizes separate exemptions for anyone who “is determined by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services . . . to have suffered a hardship
with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health
plan.”77 Plan cancelations plausibly give rise to such a “hardship” when it
comes to the “capability” of getting coverage. For many people, the
cancelation notices were a rude surprise, especially given the President’s
70 Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Senator
Mark R. Warner, 2 (Dec. 19, 2013), http://media.cmgdigital.com/shared/news/documents/
2013/12/19/Sebelius_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4ZY-M39J].
71 Id.
72 Memorandum from the Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight 1 (Dec. 19, 2013),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/cancellationconsumer-options-12-19-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/899E-T34U].
73 Memorandum from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight 3 (Mar.
5, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/regulations-and-guidance/downloads/transition-tocompliant-policies-03-06-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH65-GBPK].
74 See Opinion, ObamaCare’s Secret Mandate Exemption, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2014, at A18
(criticizing the Obama Administration for extending various hardship exemptions from the
individual mandate).
75 Ezra Klein, The Individual Mandate No Longer Applies to People Whose Plans Were Canceled,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2013/12/19/the-obama-administration-just-delayed-the-individual-mandate-for-people-whoseplans-have-been-canceled/ [https://perma.cc/U2W2-Y6CF].
76 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (2012).
77 Id. § 5000A(e)(5).
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promise that they could keep their insurance under the ACA. Those who
structured their affairs in anticipation of retaining their coverage—by stretching
their budget to lease a car, for example—unexpectedly found themselves in the
position of having to scrape up extra money to buy a health plan.
Indeed, characterizing plan cancelation as a hardship is consistent with a
guidance document—issued months before the “like it, keep it” fiasco78—
explaining that a qualifying hardship would include a “significant, unexpected
increase in essential expenses that prevented [an individual] from obtaining
coverage.”79 The fact that this particular hardship exemption is temporary
reinforces the conclusion that it does not supersede the ACA’s specific 8%
exemption governing the unaffordability of health insurance. The exemption
for those with canceled plans is, instead, a temporary patch to avoid the
financial disruption that switching to a more expensive health plan would
entail. The ACA authorizes precisely such a patch.
D. Premium Subsidies
To subsidize the purchase of health plans on the new exchanges, the ACA
extends “premium tax credits” to certain low- and middle-income individuals
who buy insurance through the new state-specific exchanges.80 The ACA invited
the states to establish the exchanges themselves; if a state declined, the Secretary
of HHS would establish a fallback exchange on the state’s behalf.81
The initial expectation was that most of the states opposed to the ACA
would prefer to establish their own exchanges, if for no other reason than to
keep the federal government out of their business. For thirty-four states,
however, the decision of whether to establish an exchange got caught up in the
political furor surrounding Obamacare, and they defaulted to the federal fallback.82
At the time, the states did not anticipate that their refusal to establish
exchanges might affect their residents’ eligibility for tax credits.83 It turns out,
however, that a complex statutory formula links the amount of those credits
to the length of time the individual is enrolled in “an Exchange established by

78
79

See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
Memorandum from Gary Cohen, Deputy Adm’r and Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs. 1 (2013), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/
exemptions-guidance-6-26-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR47-BSN7].
80 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
81 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012).
82 State Decisions on Health Insurance Marketplaces and the Medicaid Expansion, HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-decisions-for-creatinghealth-insurance-exchanges-and-expanding-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/7SXV-HS5U].
83 Brief of the Commonwealths of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance
at 1-2, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).
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the State.”84 Read literally, the provision suggests that no one in the thirty-four
states that refused to establish their own exchanges is eligible for premium
subsidies. The IRS, however, was not inclined to read the provision literally.
Instead, it adopted a rule clarifying that tax credits would be available nationwide.85
Pilloried as unlawful, the IRS’s rule led to the legal challenge that
culminated in King v. Burwell, where the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision,
upheld the validity of the rule.86 Although the Court acknowledged the literal
text of the statute supported the challengers’ position, it doubted that Congress
would have used such an elliptical way to communicate that it meant to
withhold tax credits from the residents of states that declined to establish
their own exchanges.87 The Court also pointed to other provisions of the ACA
that would make little sense if it were construed as the challengers
suggested.88 In particular, the ACA requires those “qualified individual[s]”
who are eligible to purchase health plans on an exchange to “reside[] in the
State that established the Exchange.”89 On the challengers’ theory, there
would be no qualified individuals in states that declined to establish an
exchange, meaning that no one could buy health plans at all on the federally
established exchange.90 Provisions like these, the Court reasoned, “suggest
that the Act may not always use the phrase ‘established by the State’ in its
most natural sense.”91
What appeared to clinch the case for the Court was the mismatch between
the ACA’s design and the consequences of accepting the challengers’
interpretation. Without tax credits, the Court noted, relatively healthy people
would drop coverage they could no longer afford, even as relatively unhealthy
people would keep paying their premiums.92 Insurers would have to then raise
their premiums to reflect the cost of their sicker enrollees, leading more
healthy people to shed their coverage, resulting in still-higher premiums.93
The loss of tax credits would thus “likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that

84
85
86
87

26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2013).
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
See id. at 2495 (“Had Congress meant to limit tax credits to State Exchanges, . . . [i]t would not
have used such a winding path of connect-the-dots provisions about the amount of the credit.”).
88 See id. at 2491-92 (describing “several provisions that assume tax credits will be available
on both State and Federal Exchanges”).
89 Id. at 2490 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012)).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 2493.
93 Id.
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Congress designed the Act to avoid.”94 Because the statute could be read to
avoid that “calamitous” result, the Court reasoned that it should be.95
Although the challengers’ arguments in King were not frivolous, the
Supreme Court’s decision should lay to rest the most extravagant claims
of presidential overreach. The dispute reflected a legitimate difference of
views about the proper interpretation of a complex statute—the sort of
everyday disagreement that would have attracted little attention if the
stakes were not so high.
E. Cost-Sharing Subsidies
For low-income people, making insurance affordable requires more than
subsidizing their premiums. Most of the health plans on the exchanges have
very high deductibles and require other out-of-pocket expenditures.96 To help
those who would otherwise struggle with steep cost-sharing obligations, the
ACA requires health plans on the exchanges to reduce cost-sharing levels for
enrollees who make less than 250% of the poverty level.97 The ACA then
instructs the Treasury Secretary to “make periodic and timely payments to
the [health plan] equal to the value of the reductions.”98 The cost-sharing
payments are essential to the ACA’s overall scheme to provide affordable,
near-universal coverage. Without them, health plans would have to bear the
full costs of reductions, an estimated $167 billion over ten years.99
But there’s a problem. Although the ACA directs the Treasury Secretary
to issue cost-sharing payments, it’s black-letter law that “a direction to pay
without a designation of the source of funds is not an appropriation.”100 Yet
the ACA nowhere designates a source of funds to make the cost-sharing
payments. The Obama Administration’s 2014 budget request therefore asked
Congress for an annual appropriation to cover the payments.101 Congress declined.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 2496.
96 See Matthew Rae et al., Patient Cost-Sharing in Marketplace Plans, 2016, HENRY J. KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2015), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/patient-cost-sharing-in-

marketplace-plans-2016/ [https://perma.cc/VB8G-NE5J] (noting that an average silver plan in
2016 requires enrollees to pay a $3,064 deductible).
97 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(2)(A)-(C) (2012).
98 Id. § 18071(c)(3)(A).
99 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 2024 app.
at 107 (2014).
100 1 U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-17 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter RED BOOK]; see also Guam & V.I., B-114808,
1979 WL 12213, at *3 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 7, 1979) (concluding that a statutory instruction that the
Secretary of the Treasury “shall remit” funds “merely establish[es] permanent authority for the
program rather than a permanent indefinite appropriation”).
101 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES: FISCAL YEAR
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The Administration then quietly determined that it did not need an
annual appropriation.102 It instead concluded that 31 U.S.C. § 1324 already
appropriates the money to pay for both premium tax credits and cost-sharing
reductions.103 Enacted prior to the ACA, § 1324 is a permanent appropriation
for tax refunds, including refunds arising as a result of tax credits.104 Although
cost-sharing reductions are not tax credits, the Administration believes that
the ACA, in providing for insurance subsidies in § 36B of the Internal
Revenue Code,105 created a single program to make advance payments of both
the premium tax credits and the cost-sharing reductions.106 In the
Administration’s words, credits and reductions are both “properly regarded as
‘refunds due from’ Section 36B because [they] are compensatory payments made
to subsidize an individual’s insurance coverage based on that individual’s satisfaction
of the eligibility requirements in Section 36B.”107 To demonstrate that credits are
“inextricable” from reductions, the Administration observes that an individual is
eligible for reductions only if she receives credits, that advance credits and
reductions are both paid to health plans, and that both serve to defray the
cost of health insurance.108
In addition, the Administration points to ACA provisions and post-ACA
enactments as evidence that Congress believed that it had permanently appropriated
2014 7 (2013) (describing the Administration’s request for an “annually-appropriated account[]” to
cover the cost-sharing payments).
102 The first hint of the Administration’s change of heart came when it quietly withdrew the
cost-sharing payments from the list of funds subject to the budget sequester, which applies only to
discretionary—not permanent—appropriations. Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE JOINT
COMMITTEE REDUCTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 app. at 6 (2014) (omitting the cost-sharing
payments from the list of sequestered funds), with OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB SEQUESTRATION PREVIEW REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 AND OMB REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE JOINT
COMMITTEE REDUCTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 app. at 23 (2013) (including cost-sharing
payments in the list).
103 See Letter from Sylvia M. Burwell, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to Senator Ted
Cruz & Senator Michael S. Lee 4 (May 21, 2014), http://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/
Letters/20140521_Burwell_Response.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6AP-3Y43] (noting that cost-sharing
subsidy payments are “made through the advance payments program and will be paid out of the
same account from which the premium tax credit portion of the advance payments for that
program are paid”).
104 31 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012).
105 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012).
106 See 42 U.S.C. § 18082(a)(3) (2012) (directing the Secretary of the Treasury to make
advance payments of tax credits and cost-sharing reductions to qualified health plans); id. § 18082 (c)(2)
(directing the Secretary of the Treasury to make advance payments of premium tax credits to
qualified health plans); id. § 18082(c)(3) (same with respect to cost-sharing reduction payments).
107 Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 12,
U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC, 2016 WL 2750934 (D.D.C.
May 12, 2016) [hereinafter Defendants’ Summary Judgment Brief].
108 Id. at 13.
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money for the cost-sharing payments. For example, in dozens of places the ACA
“authorized” federal spending without supplying an appropriation.109 Later Congresses
were expected to appropriate funds for that authorized spending on an annual
basis.110 There is no similar authorizing language in the ACA provision governing
cost-sharing reductions. In the Administration’s view, “There is no such . . .
language . . . because Congress understood that the ACA itself provided a
permanent appropriation.”111
The ACA also contains a restriction on using premium tax credits and
cost-sharing subsidies to pay for abortions.112 Since language restricting the
use of federal funds for abortions—the so-called Hyde Amendment—
typically appears in annual appropriations, the provision was thought
necessary only because the ACA’s core subsidy provisions required no such
appropriations.113 Similarly, in 2013, Congress passed an appropriations bill
conditioning payment of the premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions
on HHS certifying that an antifraud program was in place.114 Such a
certification, according to the Administration, would have been unnecessary
if the cost-sharing reductions had not already been appropriated.115
How does the Administration’s argument stack up? Without question, the
premium tax credits and the cost-sharing reductions form essential parts of
the same program. And the government is right that it’s hard to understand
why Congress would have deliberately created a permanent appropriation for
one and not the other. It’s not as if requiring an annual appropriation for cost-sharing
reductions would have given Congress more control over federal spending. Even
without an appropriation, the ACA creates an entitlement to cost-sharing
reductions.116 Health plans can vindicate that entitlement before the Court of

109 Id. at 14-15 (quoting Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 2705(f), 124 Stat. 119, 325 (2010)).
110 Id. at 15.
111 Id.
112 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(2)(A) (2012).
113 See 155 CONG. REC. S12,660 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[T]his
bill is not subject to appropriations.”).
114 Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 1001(a), 127 Stat. 558, 566 (2013).
115 Defendants’ Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 107, at 32.
116 Cf. 2 U.S.C. § 622(9)(A) (2012) (defining “entitlement authority” as the authority “to
make payments . . . the budget authority for which is not provided for in advance by
appropriation Acts, to any person or government if, under the provisions of the law containing
such authority, the United States is obligated to make such payments to persons or governments
who meet the requirements established by such law”); United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003) (“[A] statute creates a right capable of grounding a claim within
the [Tucker Act’s] waiver of sovereign immunity if, but only if, it ‘can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’” (quoting United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983))); Greenlee Cty. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 877
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We have repeatedly recognized that the use of the word ‘shall’ generally makes a
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Federal Claims.117 Payment would then come from the Judgment Fund—a
permanently appropriated fund to pay court judgments where “payment is
not otherwise provided for.”118
The question is thus not whether the government will pay, but when.
Given that premium tax credits have been appropriated, it’s sensible to
construe the ACA (if at all possible) to avoid the possibility that health plans
might have to bring thousands of duplicative lawsuits to obtain similar
subsidies that form part of the same program. That’s especially so given that
in 1997, Congress enacted a statute to discourage the creation of entitlements
that would have to be funded annually—so-called “backdoor spending.”119 If
Congress meant to create a new entitlement without a permanent
appropriation, the government is right that it probably would have spoken
more clearly.120
Taking a highly functional approach, the government can reasonably
maintain that fidelity to the legislative plan requires paying cost-sharing
reductions out of the same appropriation that already exists for premium tax
credits.121 The trouble is that appropriations law eschews that kind of functionalism.
By statute, “[a] law may be construed to make an appropriation out of the
Treasury . . . only if the law specifically states that an appropriation is made.”122
Nothing in the ACA specifically appropriates money for cost-sharing reductions.

statute money-mandating.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Agwiak v. United States,
347 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).
117 See N.Y. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d 743, 748 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (“It has long been
established that the mere failure of Congress to appropriate funds, without further words
modifying or repealing, expressly or by clear implication, the substantive law, does not in and of
itself defeat a Government obligation created by statute.”); RED BOOK, supra note 100, at 2-49 (“A
failure to appropriate . . . will prevent administrative agencies from making payment, but . . . is
unlikely to prevent recovery by way of a lawsuit.”). Under Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879
(1988), a suit seeking payment of mandatory cost-sharing reductions could technically be brought
against the Treasury in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Like
the plaintiff in Bowen, health plans would be seeking equitable relief—specifically, money
promised under a statute—not money damages “to remedy particular categories of past injuries or
labors.” Id. at 904 n.39. The APA supplies the right vehicle for that kind of equitable relief. But,
without an appropriation to make cost-sharing payments, the Treasury would have no funds to
draw on to comply with an order to make such payments. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496
U.S. 414, 424 (1990). Therefore, to recover, plans would have to file suit in the Court of Federal
Claims for money damages equivalent to what Treasury was obliged to pay.
118 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1) (2012).
119 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 10106(c)(1)(A), 111 Stat. 251, 682
(amending the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to allow Congress to provide “new budget
authority for any fiscal year”).
120 Defendants’ Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 107, at 31-32.
121 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (“A fair reading of legislation demands a
fair understanding of the legislative plan.”).
122 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2012).
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Although the ACA links § 36B’s premium tax credits to § 1324,123 cost-sharing
reductions aren’t established in § 36B and they also aren’t tax refunds. They
are payments to insurers to reimburse them for reducing their low-income
customers’ cost-sharing burden. It’s an enormous stretch to read an appropriation
governing refunds for individual taxpayers to also cover payments to insurers.
As for the evidence of congressional meaning, it does suggest that Congress
operated on the assumption that the ACA permanently appropriated money for
the cost-sharing reductions. But that assumption appears to have been misplaced.
Inferring an appropriation from statutory context and congressional purpose
would seem to countermand the requirement that an appropriation be
“specifically state[d].”124 What’s more, the contextual evidence that Congress
meant to permanently appropriate money for the cost-sharing payments is
far from conclusive. It’s still possible (albeit unlikely) that Congress really did
mean for the cost-sharing reductions to depend on annual appropriations for
123 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401(d)(1), 124 Stat.
119, 220 (2010) (amending 31 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(2) to include reference to § 36B of the Internal
Revenue Code).
124 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2012); see also RED BOOK, supra note 100, at 2-16 (“An appropriation
cannot be inferred or made by implication.”). The Administration has argued that this clear-statement
rule applies only to whether a particular statute appropriates money, not to the scope of an
appropriation. Defendants’ Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 107, at 29. But the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) appears to treat the clear-statement rule as applying to both
questions, perhaps because that parsimonious interpretation would undercut § 1301(d)’s effort to
afford Congress tight control over appropriations. See Architect of the Capitol, B-303961, 2004
WL 2793171 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 6, 2004) (applying the clear-statement rule to limit the scope of an
appropriation covering employee fringe benefits); U.S. Postal Serv., 50 Comp. Gen. 863 (1971)
(deploying the clear-statement rule to ascertain the temporal scope of a postal appropriations statute).
The case law, slim as it is, is to the same effect. Consider Stitzel-Weller Distillery v. Wickard.
Pursuant to a marketing order adopted under the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), whiskey
distillers deposited money with the federal government for later redistribution. Stitzel-Weller
Distillery v. Wickard, 118 F.2d 19, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1941). Like exchange plans, they operated on the
assumption that the government would honor its obligations. Id. But after the AAA was declared
partly unconstitutional in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the government determined it
could no longer pay up. Id. The distillers naturally sought to force payment of the funds. Id. To
make their case, they pointed to an existing, permanent appropriation—much like the Obama
Administration has pointed to an existing, permanent appropriation—allowing Treasury officials
to disburse “trust funds” that had been deposited with the government. Id. at 22-23 (citing 31
U.S.C. § 725r (1940)).
The government agreed that Congress had appropriated money to disburse “trust funds” but
argued that the specific list of trust funds to which it applied did not include money deposited
under AAA marketing orders. Id. at 23. The distillers insisted that the statutory omission was a
congressional oversight that the court should correct. Id. at 23. The court sided with the
government: “We are of opinion that the Act does not confer this authority, for there is certainly
nothing in . . . the Act which can be said specifically to declare the purpose of Congress to
appropriate the sum in issue here for repayment to the distillers; and without such ‘specific’
appropriation, there can be no withdrawal of the money.” Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 627 (1940)). For
the court, the specificity requirement applied not only to whether a statute was an appropriations
statute—everyone agreed that it was—but also to the scope of that appropriation.
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reasons that do not appear in the record. After all, many programs—even
mandatory spending programs, including Medicaid—are funded through
annual appropriations.125 In contrast to King, where powerful statutory evidence
indicated that Congress could not have meant quite what it said, the most natural
reading of § 1324 is consistent with a plausible and coherent legislative plan.
Even accepting the premise that Congress meant to permanently
appropriate money to cover the cost-sharing reductions, it doesn’t follow that
Congress meant § 1324 to serve as that appropriation. Indeed, it would have
been odd for Congress to fund cost-sharing reductions out of an appropriation
governing tax credits. That oddity suggests another possibility: that Congress,
in the frantic negotiations over the ACA, simply overlooked the absence of
language appropriating the money for the cost-sharing reductions.126
The argument for reading § 1324 to appropriate money for the cost-sharing
reductions is therefore thin. Indeed, the Obama Administration’s apparent legal
violation prompted the Republican-controlled House of Representatives to file
a federal lawsuit to enjoin further spending in connection with the cost-sharing
reductions. In May of this year, a Washington, D.C. district court sided with
the House.127 The court’s conclusion that the House has standing to pursue the
case is problematic;128 indeed, House v. Burwell is likely to be dismissed on
appeal. But the court’s decision on the merits of the Appropriations Clause
dispute appears correct.129
The Obama Administration’s willingness to bend the law here is to some
extent understandable. Congress’s refusal to meet the financial obligations
that it assumed in prior legislation is a breach of a longstanding convention
that Congress will appropriate the money to satisfy those obligations.130 That
breach of convention in turn imperils the Administration’s signature legislative
125 See William C. Fay & Michelle D. Rodgers, Appropriations for Mandatory Expenditures
supplemental app. 5 (Mar. 30, 2008) (unpublished seminar paper, Harvard Law School),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/MandatorySpending_17(rev).pdf
[https://perma.cc/49E3-MYEL] (detailing the nature of appropriations for Medicare, Medicaid,
and other mandatory spending programs).
126 Cf. Guam & V.I., B-114808, 1979 WL 12213, at *2 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 7, 1979) (“[W]e
would agree that Congress probably did not anticipate that appropriations would be needed . . . .
Nevertheless, . . . we must conclude that [the statutory provisions in question] do not constitute
permanent indefinite appropriations.”).
127 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967, 2016 WL 2750934 (D.D.C. May 12, 2016).
128 Compare U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 81 (D.D.C. 2015)
(finding standing), with Nicholas Bagley, Oh Boy. Here We Go Again, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST
(Sept. 9, 2015, 9:34 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/oh-boy-here-we-go-again/
[https://perma.cc/N24Q-XS94] (criticizing the court’s reasoning).
129 Nicholas Bagley, A Legal Setback for the Affordable Care Act, 374 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2307 (2016).
130 See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1380 (1988) (“[I]n the case
of statutory entitlement programs, even where Congress has not provided for a permanent
appropriation—and instead, formally enacts a new appropriation each year—internal congressional
rules and practice treat such appropriations as permanent and mandatory.”).
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achievement. Without cost-sharing payments, health plans will have to
pursue expensive and time-consuming litigation to recover what they are
owed under the ACA. The plans will pass on the costs of the litigation, delay,
and uncertainty to their customers, leading to higher premiums across the board.
Those higher premiums will strain middle-income pocketbooks, increase federal
outlays on premium tax credits, and drive healthy people from the exchanges. In
the face of committed resistance from a Republican-controlled Congress that
wishes to undermine the ACA in any way possible, the Administration may have
felt that it had little choice but to find an appropriation where none exists.
Its decision nonetheless sets a troubling precedent for future battles over
the appropriations power. Indeed, it may provide an opening to reevaluate
the formalism that has long characterized appropriations law, at least where
Congress has refused to appropriate money that it has already committed to
pay. It’s impossible to anticipate the full consequences of weakening the
legislature’s power of the purse; indeed, there’s much to be said for a practice
that refuses to countenance Congress’s stubborn unwillingness to honor its
debts. But the Administration’s efforts to put the ACA on surer financial
footing may embolden the next President to further slip the reins of legislative
control—a dynamic that could have especially serious consequences for foreign
affairs, where the appropriations power “remains one of the Congress’s few
effective legal tools to regulate presidential initiatives.”131
F. Risk Corridor Appropriations
A similar appropriations question surrounds the Administration’s funding
of the risk corridor program.132 The program serves as a financial buffer for
health plans that might otherwise be reluctant to participate on the exchanges.
For three years, beginning in 2014, health plans with gains that exceed a given
target must return some of that money to HHS.133 By the same token, plans
that rack up substantial losses get money back from the Agency.134
Without an appropriation, however, HHS cannot hand money to those
health plans that should receive it. And, as with the cost-sharing reductions,
the ACA contains no explicit appropriation for the risk corridor program. As
a result, the Congressional Research Service concluded in January 2014 that
HHS could not make any payments to insurers.135 In the meantime, Congress
131
132
133
134
135

HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 128-31 (1990).
See 42 U.S.C. § 18062 (2012) (establishing the program).
Id. § 18062(b)(2).
Id. § 18062(b)(1).
See Memorandum from Edward C. Liu, Legislative Attorney, Cong. Research Serv., to
House Energy and Commerce Comm. 3 (Jan. 23, 2014), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/
republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/20140123CRSMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/384Q-YJKG]
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has declined to appropriate funds for the risk corridor program, which a
number of leading Republicans have decried as an insurer “bailout.”136
But the tempest over the risk corridor program is overdrawn. In September
2014, the Government Accountability Office, which is vested with responsibility
for offering formal opinions on appropriations questions, concluded that an
existing appropriation covered HHS’s risk corridor payments.137 Specifically,
appropriations bills covering fiscal years 2014 and 2015 allow the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—which runs the risk corridor program—
to spend “user fees” it collects to carry out its various “responsibilities.”138 In
GAO’s view, the money that CMS collects from the risk corridor program is
properly characterized as a user fee.139 As GAO explained, the health plan “is
paying for the certainty that any potential losses related to its participation in the
Exchanges are limited to a certain amount, thus minimizing risk and maximizing
business stability for the plan.”140
GAO’s reasoning is not unassailable. Typically, a user fee is a charge imposed
on those who take advantage of a given resource. A toll for crossing a bridge, for
example, is a user fee. The risk corridor program operates differently. It’s a
pooling arrangement: health plans that make more than a target amount share
their profits with those that make less. Many health plans will thus never pay
anything to participate. It’s a little odd to call something a user fee if many
users never have to pay it.
Nonetheless, GAO’s conclusion appears basically sound. Its preexisting
definition of a user fee—“[a] fee assessed to users for goods or services
provided by the federal government”141—is broad enough to capture collections
from the risk corridor program. Up front, every health plan commits to
returning certain excess profits to the federal government. Those commitments
have financial value even if no money changes hands. When some insurers
(finding that “it does not appear that a revolving fund exists for purposes of receipts and payments
under [the risk corridor program]”).
136 See Letter from Senator Marco Rubio et al., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives 2 (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/
?File_id=7dc96d2f-1256-4816-bb06-025ed3d3363b [https://perma.cc/CG6W-GE6Y] (criticizing the
President for “ignor[ing] Congress’s explicit and exclusive authority by spending money on the
risk corridor program without an appropriation from Congress”).
137 See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., B-325630, 2014 WL4825237 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 30,
2014) (concluding that section 1342 of the ACA directs HHS to make risk corridor program
payments to health plans).
138 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, div.
G, tit. II, 128 Stat. 2130, 2477 (2014); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76,
div. H, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5, 374.
139 Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2014 WL 4825237, at *4.
140 Id.
141 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05734SP, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 100 (2005)).
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end up giving some of their excess profits to the federal government, those
payments reflect the liquidated amount of those earlier commitments. Seen
that way, it is not anomalous to treat the after-the-fact payments as user fees.142
Putting the legal question to one side, however, the Administration’s
justification has created an enormous problem. Treating collections as user
fees allows CMS to disburse only as much as it receives in collections.
Initially, CMS anticipated that collections would more than cover expenses.143
If that didn’t turn out to be the case, the Agency said that it would use any
excess money collected for 2014 and 2015 to cover 2016 shortfalls.144 And, “in
the unlikely event that risk corridor collections . . . are insufficient to make
risk corridors payments” for 2016, the Agency vaguely said that it “will use
other sources of funding for the risk corridors payments, subject to the
availability of appropriations.”145
It’s looking more and more likely that the risk corridor program will run
out of money. On October 1, 2015, HHS announced that, for 2014, health
plans were owed substantially more under the risk corridor program than they
paid in. Unprofitable plans have therefore received just 12.6% of the amount
due to them.146 Those plans could still recover what they’re owed for 2014 if
collections in 2015 and 2016 far exceed outlays,147 but most observers anticipate
that the program will end up in the red. In the meantime, the demise of many
new cooperative health plans has been attributed to low risk corridor payments.148
Congress, however, has signaled that it won’t appropriate new risk
corridor funding. Although an appropriations bill for fiscal year 2015
continues to allow CMS to spend the risk corridor money that it collects, a
rider prohibits the Administration from using newly appropriated funds to

142 For an argument that the ACA can perhaps be read to establish a revolving fund on which
the Administration could draw to make risk corridor payments, see Nicholas Bagley, Does the Risk
Corridor Program Have a Fatal Technical Flaw?, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (May 1, 2014, 6:22AM),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/does-the-risk-corridor-program-have-a-fataltechnical-flaw/ [https://perma.cc/EL4V-GM5G].
143 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment
Parameters for 2016, 79 Fed. Reg. 70,674, 70,700 (proposed Nov. 26, 2014).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Memorandum from the Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. For Medicare &
Medicaid Servs. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-andGuidance/Downloads/RC_Obligation_Guidance_11-19-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4SW-KD6Z].
147 See id. (“The remaining 2014 risk corridors payments will be made from 2015 risk
corridors collections, and if necessary, 2016 collections.”).
148 See, e.g., Timothy Jost, Risk Corridor Payments, UnitedHealth, Cooperatives, and the
Marketplaces, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Nov. 20, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/11/20/
risk-corridor-payments-unitedhealth-cooperatives-and-the-marketplaces/ [https://perma.cc/S8V4AQEU] (describing the “devastating” effect of the risk corridor program on health insurance cooperatives).
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make up for any shortfall.149 The same rider appears in the 2016 appropriations
bill.150 Senator Marco Rubio has claimed credit for the rider—indeed, his
presidential campaign said that he “[k]ill[ed] Obamacare”151—which raises
the political heat over the risk corridor program and reduces the chances that
Congress will quietly appropriate the money that health plans are entitled to.
Although health plans may eventually recover what they are owed through lawsuits
in the Court of Federal Claims,152 thinly capitalized plans that can’t withstand the
loss of anticipated risk corridor funds may struggle to stay in the market.
G. The Hill Fix
As is typical for American workers, most federal employees receive health
coverage as a fringe benefit. When an employee selects her health plan
through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), she
chooses from a list that OPM has supplied.153 To keep costs down and quality
high, OPM includes on the list only those plans with which it has contracted
directly.154 The federal government is then empowered by statute to make
contributions for “an employee . . . enrolled in a health benefits plan under
this chapter,”155 which is to say, the chapter of the U.S. Code governing the
FEHBP. Under this arrangement, the government only pays for the costs of
those plans with which OPM has contracted directly.
The ACA upsets this scheme for a tiny group of federal employees,
members of Congress and their staffers. Members and staffers can no longer
secure coverage through the FEHBP. Instead, “the only health plans that the

149 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235,
div. G, tit. II, § 227, 128 Stat. 2130, 2491 (2014) (prohibiting various funds made available by the
Act from being used for risk corridor program payments).
150 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. H, tit. II, § 225 (2015).
151 Marco Rubio (@TeamMarco), TWITTER (Nov. 24, 2015, 10:29 AM), https://twitter.com/
TeamMarco/status/669221349403983872?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw [https://perma.cc/FC8S-QXMS].
However, Senator Rubio played no part in getting the rider into the appropriations bill. See Glenn
Kessler, Rubio’s Inaccurate Claim that He “Inserted” a Provision Restricting Obamacare “Bailout” Funds,
WASH. POST: FACT CHECKER (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2015/12/23/rubios-inaccurate-claim-that-he-inserted-a-provision-restricting-obamacarebailout-funds/ [https://perma.cc/C8GW-UNHT] (crediting Representative Jack Kingston for the
rider and noting that Kingston was not influenced by Rubio).
152 See Nicholas Bagley, Did Marco Rubio Kill Obamacare?, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Dec. 1,
2015, 8:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/did-marco-rubio-kill-obamacare/
[https://perma.cc/WMS9-5UZA] (explaining why damages lawsuits are likely to be viable). As
this Article goes to press, at least six such lawsuits have been filed. See, e.g., Class Action
Complaint ¶ 13 , Health Republic Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 16-259 C (Fed. Cl. filed Feb. 24,
2016).
153 5 U.S.C. §§ 8903, 8903a, 8905(a) (2012).
154 Id. §§ 8903, 8903a.
155 Id. § 8906(b)(1).
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Federal Government may make available to Members of Congress and
congressional staff . . . shall be health plans that are . . . offered through an
Exchange established under this Act.”156
The ACA’s spare text presents a question. Now that members and staffers
must go on the exchanges, can their employer—the federal government—still
make contributions toward their health insurance? Since those contributions
are a substantial part of members’ and staffers’ overall compensation packages,
their elimination would effectively impose a large pay cut.
To avoid that result, OPM issued a rule—often called “the Hill fix”—
allowing the federal government to keep contributing to the health coverage
of their members and staffers.157 Within months, Senator Ron Johnson of
Wisconsin, together with one of his staffers, filed a high-profile lawsuit
challenging the rule.158 Johnson’s argument was straightforward: OPM can
make contributions toward a health benefits plan “under this chapter,” but the
only plans that qualify as “under this chapter” are those with which OPM has
contracted to provide coverage to federal employees.159 Because OPM does
not contract directly with exchange plans, they are not health plans “under
this chapter.”160 As such, OPM can no longer contribute to the health
insurance of members of Congress and their staffers.161 (In April of last year,
the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit for lack of standing.)162
The Administration sees matters differently. When finalizing the Hill fix,
OPM observed that Congress has actually defined “health benefits plan” for
FEHBP purposes.163 That statutory definition is broad enough to cover
basically any group health plan, OPM contract or not: “a group insurance
policy or contract, medical or hospital service agreement, membership or
subscription contract, or similar group arrangement provided by a carrier for
the purpose of providing, paying for, or reimbursing expenses for health
services.”164 Plans purchased through the small-business exchange in
156 42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(3)(D)(i) (2012). The requirement was the result of an amendment
proposed by a Republican senator who hoped it would embarrass the Democrats. “But in a bit of
jujitsu of which they were inordinately proud, Democrats instead embraced the amendment and
added it to the law.” Ezra Klein, No, Congress Isn’t Trying to Exempt Itself from Obamacare, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/04/25/nocongress-isnt-trying-to-exempt-itself-from-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/5FXC-4G2B].
157 5 C.F.R. § 890.501(h) (2016).
158 Complaint, Johnson v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 14-C-0009 (E.D. Wis. July 21, 2014).
159 Id. ¶ 53 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8906 (2012)).
160 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8906).
161 Id. ¶ 56.
162 Johnson v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 783 F.3d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 2015).
163 See Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Members of Congress and
Congressional Staff, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,653, 60,653 (Oct. 2, 2013) (noting that the ACA did not alter
the definition of “health benefits plan” for the FEHBP purposes (quoting 5 U.S.C. §8901(6) (2012))).
164 5 U.S.C. § 8901(6) (2012).
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Washington, D.C. certainly fit the bill. Such plans, OPM clarified, can
therefore qualify as “health benefits plan[s] under this chapter.”165
The Administration’s argument here is solid. Although Johnson and other
critics are right to say that the “health benefits plan under this chapter”
language is amenable to a narrower construction, they are wrong to insist that
it must be read so narrowly. The statute is ambiguous on the precise question
at hand, and OPM is vested with authority to resolve that ambiguity. It is
perfectly reasonable for OPM to avoid a construction that would read the
ACA to indiscriminately and dramatically cut the compensation of members
of Congress and their staffers. After all, the ACA says nothing—not one
word—about prohibiting the federal government from continuing to make
employer contributions. To the contrary, the Act contemplates that the
federal government will still “make available” health insurance to members of
Congress and staffers,166 reinforcing OPM’s conclusion that Congress
expected the government to keep contributing to that insurance.167
H. The Private Option
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme
Court found the ACA’s Medicaid expansion to be unconstitutionally
coercive.168 As a remedy, the Court prohibited HHS from withdrawing a
state’s existing Medicaid funding if the state declined to expand its Medicaid
program.169 Expansion became a take-it-or-leave-it decision, not a decision
upon which the future of all Medicaid funding hinged. Because the states
could realistically threaten to sit tight—indeed, nineteen states have still not
expanded Medicaid170—they earned new leverage in their negotiations with
HHS over the terms on which they would expand.171
For its part, HHS has considerable discretion, under section 1115 of the
Medicaid statute, to waive the normal rules governing Medicaid.172 Although
no federal statute or agency regulation requires section 1115 waivers to be

165
166
167

5 C.F.R. § 890.201(d) (2016) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8906).
42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(3)(D) (2012).
Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (noting that Congress “does
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions”).
168 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012).
169 Id. at 2608.
170 Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-theaffordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/P3S6-SXSC].
171 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101
GEO. L.J. 861, 911-12 (2013).
172 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 1115, 76 Stat. 172, 192. This
section of the Medicaid statute is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012).
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budget neutral,173 HHS has a “policy” of declining to approve waivers that
will increase federal outlays.174 Predicting whether a waiver will increase such
outlays is not always easy, and HHS varies its scrutiny of state applications—
and the assumptions underlying them—depending on its assessment of
the merits of the application, the plausibility of the assumptions, and
historical experience.
After NFIB, several states, led by Arkansas, requested waivers that would
channel the Medicaid expansion population into the ACA’s new exchanges.175
Under the so-called “private option,” federal Medicaid dollars would subsidize
the purchase of exchange plans.176 The hope was to persuade Republican
leaders who would not have countenanced a traditional Medicaid expansion
to endorse a market-based approach to the program.177
The challenge was HHS’s cost-neutrality rule. Because exchange plans
typically pay hospitals and physicians substantially more for their services
than Medicaid pays, they are, on average, about one-and-a-half times as
expensive as Medicaid.178 Channeling beneficiaries onto the exchanges thus
presented a serious risk of increasing federal outlays. Sensitive to the risk,
HHS adopted a rule providing that the total costs of the private option “must
be comparable to the cost of providing direct coverage” through Medicaid.179
In allowing several states to move ahead with the private option, HHS accepted
their representations that the private option would be no more expensive than a
conventional Medicaid expansion. Yet those representations were little more than
actuarial fictions. When Arkansas submitted its proposal, it did not compare the
private option to an expansion of the Medicaid program that it had in place.
Instead, it compared the private option to an expanded Medicaid program
that paid providers at the same rates as private providers.180 In other words,
Arkansas assumed not only that this hypothetical Medicaid program would
cover more people, but that it would also pay more for medical care than
Arkansas’s Medicaid program has ever paid. By artificially inflating its payment
173 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-689R, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS:
HHS’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR ARKANSAS’S MEDICAID EXPANSION WAIVER RAISES COST
CONCERNS 2 n.7 (2014) [hereinafter GAO’S ARKANSAS REPORT].
174 Id. at 2.
175 JANE B. WISHNER ET AL., URBAN INST., MEDICAID EXPANSION, THE PRIVATE
OPTION, AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS: THE USE OF SECTION 1115
WAIVERS TO IMPLEMENT MEDICAID EXPANSION UNDER THE ACA 3-4 (2015).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 17.
178 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS
OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 4
(2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-Coverage
Estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY85-JGK8].
179 42 C.F.R. § 435.1015(a)(4) (2013).
180 GAO’S ARKANSAS REPORT, supra note 173, at 7.
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rates, GAO later found, Arkansas was able to claim that a traditional
Medicaid expansion would cost about 20% more than what it would have cost
if the same payment rates were kept in place.181 Only with that 20% of extra
padding—amounting to $778 million over three years, or roughly $267 per
Arkansan—could the state argue that the private option would be cost-neutral.182
What was the basis for Arkansas’s assumption that Medicaid rates would
have to rise to private levels? Arkansas noted that expansion would swell the
rolls of Medicaid beneficiaries, which would in turn increase demand for
medical services.183 At current funding levels, however, Arkansas claimed that
not enough physicians and providers would participate in Medicaid to meet
that increased demand.184 Maintaining its current rates would thus violate the
Medicaid statute, which requires payment rates to be “sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available . . . at least to the
extent that such care and services are available to the general population.”185
Arkansas submitted no data—and HHS demanded none—to support its
assumption about the needed boost to Medicaid payments.186 But it’s an open
secret in the health-policy community that the assumption is unrealistic.187
No other state undertaking a traditional expansion has boosted its payment
rates to private levels. Arkansas itself didn’t contemplate any such increase
when it explored a traditional expansion in 2012.188 In addition, Arkansas’s
payment rates began at a substantially higher level than most states—about
20% more than the average rate and more than 50% more than the rate in

181
182

Id. at 8.
Id. at 3. The calculation above is based on a population figure of 2,915,918. Population of
Arkansas: Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map, Demographics, Statistics, Quick Facts, CENSUS
VIEWER, http://censusviewer.com/state/AR [https://perma.cc/QUM2-4MAK].
183 GAO’S ARKANSAS REPORT, supra note 173, at 7.
184 Id.
185 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2012).
186 GAO’S ARKANSAS REPORT, supra note 173, at 7.
187 See Austin Frakt, A Privatized, Exchange-Based Medicaid Will Not Be Cheaper Than Public
Medicaid, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/
wordpress/a-privatized-exchange-based-medicaid-will-not-be-cheaper-than-public-medicaid/
[https://perma.cc/5ZA5-EQVC] (arguing that Arkansas’s plan to move the Medicaid expansion
population onto the state’s ACA exchange will not save the federal government money); Austin
Frakt, The Theoretical Argument for Cost Equivalency of Private Plans and Medicaid, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Mar. 29, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/thetheoretical-argument-for-cost-equivalency-of-private-plans-and-medicaid/
[https://perma.cc/N4N5-SR5J] (criticizing the argument that the cost of covering a Medicaid
beneficiary under a private exchange plan will equal that of traditional Medicaid).
188 ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., ESTIMATED MEDICAID-RELATED IMPACT OF THE
ACA WITH EXPANSION (2012), http://humanservices.arkansas.gov/director/Documents/Updated%
20cost%20estimates%20for%20Medicaid%20expansion%20Nov%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc
/83PA-WW95].
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California.189 Why then are Arkansas’s access concerns substantially more
acute than that of other states with much lower payment rates?
HHS’s cost-neutrality rule is difficult to square with its credulousness
about state assumptions. That’s why, in a subsequent review, GAO concluded
that the Agency has “waived its cost-effectiveness requirement” in approving
the Arkansas waiver application.190 It’s not hard to understand the motivation
behind the Agency’s willful blindness. For Arkansas, the choice was not
between the private option and a traditional Medicaid expansion. The choice
was between the private option and no expansion at all. That in turn suggests
that HHS’s disregard of its own rule may in some respects be salutary. The
whole point of section 1115 is to promote state experimentation.191 Given the
intrinsic difficulty of forecasting how program changes will affect enrollment,
quality, access, and spending, HHS may reasonably think that the right
approach is to give states lots of room to run. Sometimes the price of state
cooperation is a willingness to look the other way. Perhaps HHS has good
reason for treating its cost-effectiveness rule not as a hard-and-fast constraint
on plan approval, but instead as a loose guideline that the Agency, for policy
reasons, declines to assiduously enforce.
The fight between GAO and HHS thus reflects a tension between the
scrupulous application of a black-and-white rule and a desire to encourage
experimentation in a realm of political and actuarial uncertainty. That tension
is likely to become more salient in the coming years. Starting in 2017, states
can ask the federal government to waive nearly all of the ACA’s rules within
the state pursuant to section 1332 of the Act.192 In exchange, the state must
propose an alternative plan that will cover as many people—and as generously
as the ACA already does—without “increas[ing] the Federal deficit.”193
Experience with the private option supplies a precedent for the benign
neglect of these constraints on section 1332 waivers. Instead of insisting on
realistic assumptions and careful economic modeling, HHS could emphasize
the importance of state innovation and approve state plans that fudge the
numbers. Waivers may thus become an instrument for watering down the
substantive ACA provisions in states that bridle at their perceived excesses.

189 See Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Index, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/
medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-to-medicare-fee-index/ [https://perma.cc/5HN5-W5WA]
(providing state-by-state data on Medicaid-provider payment rates from 2014).
190 GAO’S ARKANSAS REPORT, supra note 173, at 3.
191 See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012) (providing discretion for Secretary to grant states waivers for
Medicaid requirements in cases of “any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the
judgment of the Secretary, is likely assist in promoting the objectives of [the Medicaid statute]”).
192 Id. § 18052(a)(1), Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1332(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 203 (2010).
193 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(1)(D).
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II. AN ASSESSMENT
Collectively, these eight implementation episodes represent the most substantial
and legally controversial steps associated with the ACA’s implementation. Yet, even
in this highly biased sample, the Administration’s track record is good. It has
usually—albeit not always—colored within the lines. Stepping back, the
Administration’s record looks even more impressive. Over the course of the past
six years, the Administration has made many thousands of legally unimpeachable
decisions in connection with the ACA, including instances where it has stuck to the
ACA even in the face of intense political pressure.
Three examples stand out. First, take the so-called “family glitch.” Under
the ACA, an individual and her family members are ineligible for premium
subsidies if the individual’s employer offers her affordable coverage—coverage
that costs less than 9.5% of household income.194 What if individual coverage is
affordable but family coverage is not? If the employee declines to take the
unaffordable family coverage, will her family members be eligible for
premium subsidies on the exchanges? In February 2013, the IRS said no, even
though “experts at every point along the political spectrum agree that the . . .
interpretation unfairly penalizes families.”195 The law left the Administration
no choice. As the IRS explained, “The language of section 36B . . . specifies
that the affordability test for related individuals [i.e., family members] is
based on the cost of self-only coverage.”196 Because of the family glitch,
between two and four million people nationwide will lose access to subsidized
coverage,197 including at least 460,000 children.198
Second, union leaders spent years lobbying the Administration to allow their
members greater access to premium subsidies. Under the Taft-Hartley Act,
employers can band together and, working with unions, offer health benefits to
their employee-members through a jointly administered fund.199 Many union
members receive health coverage through Taft-Hartley plans as a fringe benefit
of their employment.200 Since they receive coverage through their jobs, however,
194 See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)(i), (C)(i) (2012) (excluding from eligibility for tax credits
those eligible for minimum essential coverage from an employer plan in which the employee’s
contribution is less than 9.5% of household income).
195 Tricia Brooks, Health Policy Brief: The Family Glitch, HEALTH AFF., Nov. 10, 2014, at 3,
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_129.pdf [https://perma.cc
/PS3P-CXBS].
196 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 78 Fed. Reg. 7264, 7265 (Feb. 1, 2013).
197 Brooks, supra note 195, at 2.
198 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-648, CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR IMPROVED ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE INSURANCE 14 fig.1 (2012).
199 Taft-Hartley Trust Funds, THE MASS. COAL. OF TAFT-HARTLEY TR. FUNDS, INC.,
http://www.macoalthtf.org/new-page/taft-hartley-trust-funds.html [https://perma.cc/63JN-HD79].
200 See id. (noting that Taft-Hartley plans are common in the construction, retail, trucking,
and warehouse industries).
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union members are ineligible to get premium subsidies under the ACA.201
Several large, politically powerful unions believed this was discriminatory: why
should union members not get subsidies available to other people?202 Citing the
delays of the employer mandate as support, they avidly sought a regulatory fix of
questionable legality from the Administration.203 When the Administration
declined—in its view, Taft-Hartley plans were clearly employer-sponsored
plans and had to be treated as such204—the unions excoriated President
Obama for betraying them.205
Third, think back to the risk corridor program, which was meant to provide
a backstop for health plans that sustained greater-than-anticipated losses on the
exchanges.206 The program was especially important for the ACA’s new
“cooperative health plans,” which received substantial financial support to

201
202

See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
See Letter from James. P. Hoffa, Gen. President, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters et al., to Harry
Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate & Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of
Representatives (July 12, 2014) [hereinafter Hoffa] (explaining that they have been “bringing
[their] deep concerns to the Administration, seeking reasonable regulatory interpretations to the
statute that would help prevent the destruction of non-profit health plans” like the ones provided
by unions), in Tom Gara, Union Letter: Obamacare Will ‘Destroy the Very Health and Wellbeing’ of
Workers, WALL ST. J.: CORP. INTELLIGENCE (July 12, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
corporate-intelligence/2013/07/12/union-letter-obamacare-will-destroy-the-very-health-andwellbeing-of-workers/ [https://perma.cc/TKV5-YRQS]; Brian Beutler, What’s Behind The Big
Union Attack On Obamacare?, TALKING POINTS MEMO: TPM DC (July 22, 2013, 12:53 PM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/what-s-behind-the-big-union-attack-on-obamacare
[https://perma.cc/85CA-7RMQ] (describing the unions’ concern that the ACA will lead employers
with unionized employees to abandon Taft-Hartley plans and shuffle employees onto the exchanges).
203 Hoffa, supra note 202.
204 See Memorandum from Bernadette Fernandez, Specialist in Health Care Fin., Domestic
Soc. Policy Div., Cong. Research Serv. & Jon O. Shimabukuro, Legislative Attorney, Am. Law
Div., Cong. Research Serv. to Todd Spangler, House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce 2 (Mar.
11, 2013), http://www.healthreformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/CRS-multiemployer-6-25.pdf
[https://perma.cc/327Q-X7AK] (“Because a multiemployer health plan would seem to constitute
minimum essential coverage . . . it seems unlikely that an individual who is enrolled in a
multiemployer health plan would be eligible for a premium tax credit.”); Dave Jamieson, Unions To
White House On Obamacare, Taft-Hartley Plans: ‘You Made The Problem, You Fix It’, HUFFINGTON
POST: POLITICS (Aug. 21, 2013, 2:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/21/unionsobamacare-taft-hartley_n_3790548.html [https://perma.cc/2VN5-9M3C] (noting the
Administration’s view that “Taft-Hartley plans [are] equivalent to other employer-based plans,
which aren’t eligible for subsidies”).
205 See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Tom Hamburger, Labor Union Officials Say Obama Betrayed
Them in Health-Care Rollout, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/labor-union-officials-say-obama-betrayed-them-in-health-care-rollout/2014/01/31/2cd
a6afc-8789-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html [https://perma.cc/82QJ-FSN9] (noting unions’
complaint that “the Affordable Care Act has subjected union health plans to new taxes and
mandates while not allowing them to share in the subsidies”).
206 See supra Section I.F.
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help them get up and running.207 When Congress refused to fully fund the
risk corridor program, the Obama Administration knew that many of the
coops could face financial ruin.208 But the Administration adhered to the
appropriations restrictions that Congress established—and watched as more
than half the coops folded.209
Taken as a whole, then, the record refutes the claim that President Obama
has systematically disregarded the ACA’s text or displayed contempt for legal
constraints. He hasn’t. The law still has bite. On occasion, however, the
Administration has strayed beyond legal limits. Two episodes raise especially
serious legal concerns: the administrative delays210 and the decision to finance
cost-sharing reductions out of an appropriation governing tax refunds.211 In both
cases, Republican recalcitrance threatened to undermine the President’s signal
achievement. And in both cases, the President appears to have broken the law.
Just how troubling this should be is open to question. In soccer, a striker
who’s never offside is not trying hard enough to score. Likewise, in
government, a President who never pushes up against legal boundaries—and,
in so pushing, occasionally exceeds them—may sacrifice effectiveness and fail
to honor the wishes of those who elected him to office. Perhaps, as David
Pozen has recently argued, there’s even something to be said for presidential
self-help—otherwise-unlawful actions that are legitimate countermeasures to
Congress’s refusal to adhere to conventions that allow the government to
function.212 Indeed, presidential self-help is here whether we like it or not:
it’s an inevitable response to the widespread perception of governmental
breakdown. If it’s inevitable, castigating the Administration for its legal
violations seems about as helpful as Lear railing at the storm. Better, in
Pozen’s view, to put self-help in a legal framework and create rules governing
when it is a legitimate and even constructive response to the dysfunction of
the political system.213
The price of such self-help, however, is likely to be paid in the further
accretion of executive power, in the setting of precedents that make it easier
for future Presidents to sidestep legal constraints, and in the tit-for-tat escalation
207 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 16-326, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE:
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, PREMIUMS, AND ENROLLMENT FOR CONSUMER OPERATED AND
ORIENTED PLANS IN 2015 6-7 (2016).
208 Id. at 17.
209 Id. at 1-2.
210 See supra Section I.B.
211 See supra Section I.E.
212 David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 7-8 (2014); see also
N. W. Barber, Self-Defence for Institutions, 72 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 558, 559 (2013) (discussing
institutional self-defense mechanisms that protect institutions from other constitutional bodies).
213 See Pozen, supra note 212, at 61 (describing the benefits that would follow from adhering
to a set of self-help conventions).
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of interbranch conflict. It’s not easy to tally those diffuse, systemic costs, but
they are serious. Because the sitting President will not bear most of them,
and because he is invested in the success of his administration, there’s reason
to fear he may be too cavalier about invoking his right to self-help. That’s why
William Marshall calls Pozen’s article “one of the most dangerous” ever written:214
The last thing American constitutional law needs is another rationale that
could be used to justify an expansive exercise of executive branch power,
particularly when that exercise is based on little more than a President’s own
conclusion that Congress has somehow engaged in constitutional wrongdoing
when it aggressively seeks to frustrate her agenda.215

In other words, Marshall insists on presidential abstinence. If we deny
that self-help is legitimate, the President will more often stay within legal
bounds. Pozen, in contrast, wants to talk about contraception. Teenagers will
have sex; Presidents will break the law. Let’s make sure they do it responsibly.
Resolving this debate depends in part on evidence. The argument for selfhelp depends on the assumption that self-help can be disciplined—that sex can
be safer—if we craft a set of legal rules to govern its use. But is that true? For
support, Pozen draws a plausible but imperfect analogy to international law,
where legal rules have long shaped state-to-state countermeasures,216 arguing
that past exercises of presidential self-help have loosely respected informal
norms that have kept those exercises within tolerable bounds.217 What he can’t
supply is compelling evidence that, in the domestic context, the President
will adhere sufficiently often to the limits on his self-help authority so as to
make it a legitimate part of the give-and-take between the branches. The
reasons that a President breaks the law in the first place may also make him
insensitive to legal limits on the exercise of self-help.
Marshall’s argument suffers from a similar evidentiary gap. It might be
true that endorsing constitutional countermeasures will encourage more
presidential lawlessness, but it might not. In an age of perceived congressional
dysfunction, the President already has powerful incentives to sidestep the law.
Whether there’s a discourse legitimating some forms of self-help will
probably not make much of a difference. And even if self-help becomes more
common, it’s possible that it will be more restrained because of conventions
governing its use. More sex, but safer sex.

214 William P. Marshall, Warning!: Self-Help and the Presidency, 124 YALE L.J. F. 95, 98 (2014),
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/self-help-and-the-presidency [https://perma.cc/J2BJ-9YPX].
215 Id.
216 Pozen, supra note 212, at 52-58.
217 Id. at 27-48.
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The saga of the ACA’s implementation offers comfort to both sides. On
the self-help side of the ledger, no one questions the intensity of congressional
antipathy for the reform law. In the eyes of many, that antipathy has passed
well beyond loyal opposition and into the realm of bad faith.218 The
Republican-controlled House has voted at least fifty-six times to repeal the
statute.219 Opponents have seized on distortions and lies about the ACA to
prevent its adoption and impede its implementation. And Congress has
actively worked to hobble the ACA even if doing so will harm people,
reckoning that a maimed statute will be more easily uprooted. If self-help is
warranted anywhere—and it may not be—it would seem to be warranted here.
On that view, the Administration’s legal excesses can be seen as proportionate
responses to congressional intransigence. The administrative delays, for
example, are only temporary measures to ease implementation of the complex
law.220 They did not purport to permanently change the ACA’s basic contours.
Similarly, when Congress breached the convention that it will appropriate the
funds necessary to discharge its mandatory obligations,221 the Administration
fashioned a narrow countermeasure. Indeed, that countermeasure can be seen as
a bid to create its own kind of self-help convention: although the President
cannot withdraw funds from the Treasury without an appropriation, he will
aggressively construe statutes to find such an appropriation where Congress,
in a deliberate bid to thwart a duly enacted law, refuses to honor its
obligations. That’s arguably a salutary development. Congress’s bullheaded
refusal to pay its debts shouldn’t be encouraged.
The argument in favor of self-help also finds support in the political
damage that the President has sustained for skirting the law. The storyline of
an imperial President—a storyline reinforced by ACA implementation
decisions—has become a recurring political theme, even a cliché.222 Politicians
believe—with good reason—that the American public cares about the law and

218 See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, The Bad Faith of Mandate Critics, Part 2, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 4,
2011), https://newrepublic.com/article/82828/the-bad-faith-mandate-critics-part-2 [https://perma.cc
/YH5N-FXAN] (criticizing the ACA’s conservative critics for being “mere opportunists”).
219 Cristina Marcos, Dems Invoke Groundhog Day for ObamaCare Repeal Vote, HILL: FLOOR
ACTION (Feb. 2, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/231452-demsinvoke-groundhog-day-for-obamacare-repeal-vote [https://perma.cc/4QBP-NYRD].
220 See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Simon Lazarus, Obama’s ACA Delays—Breaking the Law
or Making It Work?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1970 (2014) (articulating the Administration’s view that
the delays do not constitute a refusal to enforce the law as written but are instead temporary
measures to ensure effective implementation).
221 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
222 See Juan David Romero, Obama Is a Dictator. And a Tyrant. And a . . ., NEW REPUBLIC
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120347/obama-anything-president-tyrant-dictatorand-king [https://perma.cc/QAC3-RL3Y] (cataloging prominent conservatives labeling Obama a
“monarch,” “Caesar,” “dictator,” “emperor,” “king,” and “autocrat”).
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will punish a President who flouts it.223 Even if a limited right to self-help
were to become a recognized, legitimate feature of the separation of powers,
the President will likely hesitate before exercising that right, just as he
hesitates before exercising his acknowledged right to veto a piece of
legislation. Political repercussions thus offer a plausible mechanism for assuring
that self-help stays within tolerable bounds.
All this suggests that there’s something to be said for constitutional
countermeasures. At the same time, it’s hard to look at these episodes and not
be troubled. Consider the delays. 224 The Administration did not publicly
lobby Congress to delay the employer mandate only to have it resist. Rather,
the delay was a concession to an influential group that might have otherwise
raised a ruckus. Nor is it entirely convincing to treat the “like it, keep it” fix225
as a response to congressional intransigence. To the contrary, the Administration
moved to forestall Congress from acting—and thus prevent it from passing
legislation that, in the Administration’s view, would have undermined the
ACA.226 The delays thus potentially stand as broad precedent for putting off the
effective dates of statutes for reasons of political expedience.
The appropriations dispute raises a different set of concerns. Slow to act and
difficult to raise from its torpor, Congress is at a disadvantage when it comes to
regulating executive conduct, especially on the international plane.227 But it is not
altogether inactive; in particular, the appropriations power gives Congress
substantial leverage over the Executive even in domains—like foreign affairs228—
where Congress has seen its influence decline. Whittling away at the
appropriations power thus sets a dangerous example, at least for those who worry
about the rising tide of executive authority.
The story of the cost-sharing reductions also suggests that the whittling
away will happen quietly—not through a frontal assault on the appropriations
power, but through statutory construction. At best, the argument for linking
§ 1324 to the cost-sharing reductions is strained and unpersuasive.229 At
223 See Julian Davis Mortenson, Law Matters, Even to the Executive, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1015,
1017 (2014) (“[I]n the United States, respect for legality is a core component of the collective
national culture . . . .”).
224 See supra notes 39–40, 45 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 41–43, 46 and accompanying text.
226 See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Statement by the
President on the Affordable Care Act (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/11/14/statement-president-affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/C9A5-H2PY] (“I will
not accept [congressional] proposals that are just another brazen attempt to undermine or repeal
the overall law and drag us back into a broken system.”).
227 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 132, 161-65 (1999).
228 Kristina Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 AM. J. INT’L L.
517, 533 (2013).
229 See supra notes 103–15 and accompanying text.
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worst, it’s a makeweight that obscures a violation of the Appropriations
Clause. That obscuration is arguably the point. Creative interpretation is
appealing because condemnation can be met with a lawyerly argument about
technical statutory text. So long as the dispute can be kept out of the courts—
and the Administration is working overtime to get House v. Burwell dismissed
on appeal—blowback is likely to be muted.
Indeed, the fact that the Obama Administration believed that it had no
choice but to deploy this sort of lawyerly argument underscores just how hard
it would be to embed self-help into American constitutional law. Although
the President has acknowledged that congressional intransigence has spurred
the need for unilateral action,230 the President has not openly deployed that
intransigence as an argument to bolster the legality of contestable moves. He
has instead adhered to an apparent convention of defending even his most
dubious executive actions in traditional legal terms.
The felt need to adhere to that convention may partly reflect skittishness
about judicial review. The courts will not take kindly to an argument that
acknowledges the unlawfulness of an administrative action but nonetheless
defends it as a proportionate countermeasure. But it also reflects something
more profound. Even absent a court threat, the bureaucracy appears to
demand a legal justification that won’t be a political liability if it comes to
light. Otherwise, the Administration would dispense with the convention
where the risk of litigation was trivial—say, with the delay of the employer
mandate. That demand for a legal justification in turn underscores the depth
of the public’s commitment to the principle that political leaders must
maintain fidelity to law even in the face of serious provocation. The
convention preventing a President from acknowledging that a particular
action exceeds traditional legal bounds will impede efforts to publicly
legitimize a practice of proportional countermeasures.
And eventually, the courts will lose patience with a presidential practice
of dressing up lawbreaking in the garb of law. House v. Burwell exemplifies
the dynamic.231 The district court’s conclusion that the House has standing to
sue over the appropriations dispute is both unprecedented and difficult to square
with existing law.232 The decision makes sense, however, as a ham-fisted effort to
use judicial review to make up for the collapse of durable conventions that might
230 See Pozen, supra note 212, at 43-44 (“The President’s entire ‘We Can’t Wait’ campaign can
be seen as an advertisement for executive self-help in response to a Congress that, according to
Obama, will not ‘do its job.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting We Can’t Wait, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/jobs/we-cant-wait [https://perma.cc/GD9S-5K9C])).
231 See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
232 See Nicholas Bagley, An Immediate Appeal in House v. Burwell?, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Sept. 22, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/animmediate-appeal-in-house-v-burwell/ [https://perma.cc/3ZE5-RR6N] (criticizing the decision).
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have disciplined executive lawbreaking.233 That does not imply that the district
court’s holding is right. Indeed, cumbersome and unwieldy litigation may
impede the formation of new conventions that would better discipline executive
lawbreaking. Right or wrong, however, the district court’s assertiveness in House
v. Burwell should come as no surprise.
To be clear, creating a discourse around self-help would generate a more
refined sense of what distinguishes legitimate countermeasures from
illegitimate usurpation. Perhaps such a discourse would lead to new conventions
that could reliably govern self-help. But I will confess to skepticism. After all,
the key to enforcing a convention is a public sanction for its violation. In a
healthy legal culture, breaches do not go unanswered. Yet the rise of
hyperpolarized politics seems to have diminished that public sanction. Nowadays,
the President can often count on support—or at least silence—from like-minded
attorneys, legal academics, and other expert commentators. During the ACA’s
rollout, for example, almost no Democratic lawyers spoke out against the
Obama Administration’s controversial legal moves, just as almost no
Republican lawyers spoke in defense of them. Law, I fear, is increasingly seen
as simply another move in a partisan game—a raw extension of politics with
less persuasive force of its own. If that’s the view of law that has enabled
Congress to disregard conventions, why won’t that same view lead to
presidential disregard of similar self-help conventions?
At the end of the day, the story of the ACA’s implementation leaves me
equally encouraged and unsettled. Law still matters; it’s not politics all the
way down. At the same time, the Obama Administration’s legal violations
don’t appear to be idiosyncratic expressions of a particular President’s governing
style, but more-or-less inevitable reactions to polarization and the breakdown of
governing conventions. While I am skeptical that self-help conventions will
reliably discipline such lawbreaking, I don’t have better answers for how to
restrain the President. That’s why it’s hard for me to shake the fear that we
are entering an era marked by a relentless chipping away at the rule of law. I
do not want to seem alarmist; for now, such chipping is modest. But it may
become a durable feature of American governance—if it isn’t one already—
with consequences I can’t begin to anticipate. In contrast to some,234 I don’t
view the trend with equanimity. The rule of law is a terrible thing to waste.

233 See Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1949, 1958 (2016) (observing
that “law substitutes imperfectly for regulation-by-convention”); cf. Richard H. Pildes, Institutional
Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (observing that
courts can “adapt legal doctrine to take account of how [governmental] institutions actually
function in, and over, time”).
234 See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010).
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In the meantime, some legal questions have answers. In trying to supply
those answers, my hope is to call attention to a record that is neither as dismal
as its detractors claim nor as rosy as its supporters believe. The Obama
Administration has overwhelmingly kept faith with the rule of law as it
implemented the ACA, even as it has occasionally breached legal limits and
set unfortunate precedents. Only time will tell whether the Administration
has paid too high a price for health reform.

